Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive, symmetric or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action pro…le that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct an experiment to compare the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in an application on vertical multilateral contracting. We …nd that our criterion outperforms the other selection criteria.
Introduction
We propose a solution to the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in a class of twostage games in which players who move at the second stage (receivers) are imperfectly informed about the actions played by those who move at the …rst stage (proposers).
The most prominent application of this class of games is multi-lateral vertical contracting. These are games in which one or more upstream …rms make private o¤ers to each of two or more downstream …rms. Each contract signed by a downstream …rm a¤ects all downstream …rms (contracts generate externalities), but at the time a downstream …rm decides whether or not to accept the o¤er, it does not know what o¤ers other …rms have received (downstream …rms operate under imperfect information). 1 Other applications of this class of games can be found in the literature of consumer search; international trade; markets with network e¤ects; markets with intermediaries; …nancial and health care markets; and in games of electoral competition. 2 These games typically feature multiple Sequential equilibria. Equilibria depend on how, after observing a deviation, the second movers update their beliefs about the …rst movers' actions. Re…nements that are useful for signaling games such as the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) , D1 or universal divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987) have no bite in this context, because the lack of information is about 1 See theories by Hart and Tirole (1990) ; O'Brien and Sha¤er (1992); Segal (1999) liefs are such that a downstream player who observes a deviation believes that the upstream player must have deviated to a strategy that is optimal given the action that the downstream player observes. Despite their greater conceptual merit, unfortunately wary beliefs have had scant following in the literature of vertical contracting (Rey and Vergé, 2004; Avenel, 2012a; Reisinger and Tarantino, 2015) . Hagiu and Ha÷ aburda (2014) apply it in a setup with markets with two-sided network e¤ects. 5 The problem common to all these criteria is the lack of a convincing argument for why only one particular set of beliefs should be admissible o¤ the equilibrium path. The existence of several alternative choices of speci…c beliefs that have received consideration in the literature underscores that none of these beliefs are an obvious choice for all possible games of imperfect information. Eliminating all equilibria that rest on di¤erent beliefs is not warranted. We argue that passive beliefs, wary beliefs, or symmetric beliefs, may be plausible in a given particular application, but not in others. A sharp restriction on the set of admissible beliefs to the exclusion of all others is often inappropriate. Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) provide evidence of the weakness of this approach. Using a laboratory experiment that mimics a vertical industry structure with an upstream …rm and two competing downstream …rms, they …nd that no speci…c restriction on beliefs (passive or symmetric beliefs) is consistent with the data. 6 A more cautious or modest approach is to accept that we cannot pin down the exact beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, beyond the standard consistency restriction on beliefs required in a Sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) . Any assumption of speci…c equilibrium beliefs, even a plausible one, is ad hoc and it is di¢ cult 5 Passive and wary beliefs are justi…ed by two very di¤erent rationales. Passive beliefs consider deviations from the equilibrium strategy as unintented mover's mistakes; therefore, receivers should not revise their beliefs. In contrast, wary beliefs implicitly interpret deviations as mover's intentional attempts to leave the equilibrium path. In that case, receivers should revise their beliefs accordingly. Still, wary beliefs cannot rationalize why in the …rst instance the mover deviated from the equilibrium strategy. 6 See as well the contracting experiments by Boone, Müller and Suetens (2014) , and by Möllers, Normann and Snyder (2016). to justify as superior to all others.
We solve the multiplicity problem by suggesting that the equilibrium action pro…le most likely to emerge is the action pro…le that can be supported in equilibrium by the largest set of di¤erent beliefs. In application of Bernoulli's (1713) and Laplace's (1820) "Principle of Insu¢ cient Reason,"absent any motivation to consider some equilibrium beliefs as more likely to emerge than others, we should treat all equilibrium beliefs as a priori equally probable to emerge. 7 If so, the strategy pro…le and action pro…le most likely to be played in equilibrium are the ones that can be sustained by the largest collection of di¤erent equilibrium beliefs. We predict that this action pro…le will be the one played in equilibrium.
We do not identify the speci…c beliefs that support the predicted action pro…le in equilibrium: we make a prediction only about players'equilibrium actions. Since actions (unlike beliefs) are directly observable, our predictions are directly testable.
Our selection criterion provides a "stress test" measure of the robustness of an equilibrium path of play to changes in the beliefs for which it is sustained. The criterion explores how likely is it that the particular path of play is still played in equilibrium if beliefs change, and then selects the equilibrium path of play most likely to be played in a new equilibrium after the change of beliefs.
If a pro…le of actions a is played in equilibrium only under some narrowly speci…c beliefs (so only one or few equilibria result in playing a), while on the other hand action pro…le a 0 can be supported regardless of agents'o¤-path beliefs, or for a wide array of possible beliefs (so that lots of di¤erent equilibria result in playing a 0 ), then we predict that in equilibrium, players will play according to a 0 ; not a: In Section 2, we o¤er a simple example to illustrate our approach.
More generally, to identify the equilibrium actions that are most robust in the sense that they can be sustained in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs, we 7 As de…ned by Wolfram Mathworld, the Principle of Insu¢ cient Reason states that "if we are ignorant of the ways an event can occur (and therefore have no reason to believe that one way will occur preferentially compared to another), the event will occur equally likely in any way." proceed in three steps. First, we de…ne a measure over sets of out of equilibrium beliefs. In line with the Principle of Insu¢ cient Reason, we use the standard Lebesgue measure. Second, for each strategy pro…le, we identify the set of beliefs that support this strategy pro…le in equilibrium. For each action pro…le, we calculate the measure of the set of beliefs that support at least one equilibrium strategy pro…le in which this action pro…le is played. Finally, we select the action pro…le with the largest set of beliefs that support it as an equilibrium action pro…le. In any …nite game, our criterion yields a non-empty prediction, a property that selection by passive, symmetric or wary beliefs fails to meet.
We compare the predictive power of several selection criteria, including selection by the largest of beliefs, using a laboratory experiment on a vertical multilateral contracting game.
We …nd that selection according to the largest set of beliefs has better predictive power than any of the other selection criteria. Over all treatments, 74% of groups of agents play some equilibrium, and among these, 94% play the equilibrium selected by the largest set of supporting beliefs, while only 54% play the equilibrium selected by passive or wary beliefs and only 46% play the equilibrium supported by symmetric beliefs. We …nd strong and signi…cant comparative statics across treatments. These di¤erences across treatments correspond perfectly with the comparative static predictions of our selection criterion, and clash with the predictions of each of the other equilibrium selection criteria.
Our results show that in a multilateral contracting game, our criterion correctly predicts which action pro…le is more likely to emerge. An important question concerns the external robustness of our criterion's predictions. Our selection criterion was originally designed to resolve the multiplicity of equilibria in a game of electoral competition over multiple districts. We tested our predictions for this electoral competition game in laboratory experiments. The criterion performed reasonably well in this application, for which it was designed. 8 The experiments and results on vertical contracting that we detail in Section 4 are a …rst test of the external validity and robustness of our criterion. Whether our criterion is similarly useful in other applications (beyond multi-district electoral competition and multi-lateral vertical contracting) remains an open question. We conjecture that it will perform better in cases in which the di¤erence in the size of equilibrium beliefs that support each equilibrium is very large, and not so well if this di¤erence is very small. Tests across a wide range of games and applications would best settle this question as to whether our conjecture holds.
A second central limitation of our study is that we do not demonstrate that individuals behave in line with the re…nement we o¤er for the reasons for which the re…nement is prescribed. That is, we do not provide a theory of belief formation underlying our re…nement and explain which beliefs players should hold. Our theoretical contribution predicts how agents will play, but it does not explain why nor do we investigate why within our experiment. In any application in which there are good reasons to assume speci…c beliefs, researchers should use these beliefs and not our approach. We recommend using our selection criterion only as a second best, in applications in which researchers do not have a clear basis on which to theorize how subjects form out of equilibrium beliefs.
In what follows we …rst o¤er a motivating example. We then de…ne our selection criterion and we present our experiments on vertical contracting. Appendixes A1-A5 contain proofs, additional results, a microfoundation of the experimental parameters, a discussion of alternative selection criteria, and experimental instructions. 8 The experimental design, procedures and data analysis of this electoral competition experiment are available in the working paper version Eguia, Llorente-Saguer, Morton and Nicolò (2014).
A Motivating Example
Consider a simpli…ed vertical contracting game with one supplier and two retailers.
A supplier makes independent o¤ers to each of two retailers f1; 2g. Let i denote an arbitrary retailer and let i denote the other retailer. The supplier o¤ers to sell a product either at an exogenously given high price p H 2 (15; 20); or a low price p L = 7. O¤ers are simultaneously and privately made, so that each retailer observes the price o¤ered to her, but not the price the other retailer is o¤ered. Each retailer chooses an integer amount of units to purchase, which must be between 0 and 3. Let q i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g be the quantity purchased by retailer i. Retailers sell their units of the product in the consumer market. The unitary price of the product in the consumer market is strictly decreasing in the aggregate supply Q = q 1 + q 2 and is summarized in the following Notice that if Q > 5 retailers'pro…ts are negative if they buy any quantity from the supplier. Assume the supplier's marginal costs are equal to zero. Let prod (p i ; q i ) with i 2 f1; 2g denote the supplier's pro…ts when she sells q i units at price p i to retailer i: Then prod (p L ; 3) > prod (p H ; 1) > prod (p L ; 2) > 0: In the other equilibrium the supplier o¤ers p H to both retailers and each retailer buys 1 unit if the price o¤ered is p H and 2 units if the price is p L .
O¤-path beliefs are critical to sustain one or the other equilibrium. 9 Whether an equilibrium holds or not hinges on the belief that the other retailer was o¤ered a high price p H , following a deviation. If, following a deviation, the probability assigned to a high price for the other retailer is low enough, the equilibrium holds. Otherwise, it fails.
For each retailer i 2 f1; 2g, let an out of equilibrium belief ! i (p H jp i ) 2 [0; 1] be the probability that i assigns to the event that retailer i is o¤ered p H ; when i receives an o¤-equilibrium o¤erp i . The equilibrium with supplier's strategy (p L ; p L ) is supported by beliefs such that, after observing o¤erp i = p H ; retailer i chooses not to purchase any unit, which implies that buying either one or two units 10 gives negative pro…ts.
That is, buying one unit is not pro…table:
and buying two units is also not pro…table:
:
The equilibrium with the pair of o¤ers (p H ; p H ) is supported by beliefs such that, observing an o¤-equilibrium o¤erp i = p L ; retailer i chooses to purchase two units and not three units, 11 which implies that 10 7);
Which prediction is more reliable? Passive beliefs support the equilibrium with We argue that the focal equilibrium must depend on the value of parameter p H :
We expect that the equilibrium most likely to be played is the one sustained by the largest set of beliefs. The equilibrium in which the supplier's strategy pro…le and we argue that then the equilibrium in which the supplier proposes (p L ; p L ) is more robust.
In the next section we formalize this intuition for a larger class of games.
A New Selection Criterion
Consider a class of …nite extensive form games G with one upstream player (proposer), and two or more downstream players (receivers). 12 Let 0 denote the proposer, and let R denote a set of receivers. The proposer moves …rst: 0 chooses an action a 0 2 A 0 ;
where A 0 is a …nite set of feasible actions for the proposer. For each receiver i 2 R; let i (A 0 ) denote a partition of A 0 ; and for any a 0 2 A 0 ; let i (a 0 ) denote the element of partition i (A 0 ) that contains a 0 : We assume that if the proposer chooses action a 0 ; receiver i observes i (a 0 ). At the second and last stage, all receivers take simultaneous actions in response to the information they have observed. We do not impose any restrictions or assumptions (beyond …niteness) on the action set of receivers.
For any game 2 G; let s 0 denote a pure strategy for the proposer, s R a receivers' pure strategy pro…le, and s = (s 0 ; s R ) a pure strategy pro…le. Let S 0 ; S R and S = S 0 S R be the set of all proposer's pure strategies, the set of all receivers'strategy pro…les, and the set of all strategy pro…les. Since the proposer's set of pure strategies is the set of actions available to the proposer, the proposer's strategy pro…le and proposer's action pro…le coincide. Let I be an information set in game ; after the proposer moves. Let I be the collection of all information sets, so that jIj denotes the number of information sets in this collection, and for each I 2 I; let i(I) be the player who moves at information set I. For any action pro…le a = (a 0 ; a a 0 R ) 2 A; let S a = fs 2 S : s 0 = a 0 and s R (I) = a a 0 R (I) for each I 2 I(a 0 )g be the subset of strategy pro…les such that according to any strategy pro…le in S a , agents play action pro…le a along the equilibrium path. Our criterion allows for the ranking of all the equilibrium action pro…les according to the size of the sets of supporting beliefs, from the action pro…le with the largest set of supporting beliefs to the one with the smallest set. Therefore, di¤erently from standard selection criteria we are able to compare any pair of action pro…les of equilibria and assess which is the one that is most likely to be played according to our criterion. 13 We can also take a further step, relying on a cardinal interpretation of our criterion to assess the robustness of the proposed selection, by comparing the size of the largest set of supporting beliefs and the size of the second largest set in the ranking. For instance, in our introductory example in Section 2 if p H = 15:3, the proposer's action pro…le of equilibrium (p L ; p L ) had a size of supporting beliefs equal to 0:05 while the other proposer's action pro…le of equilibrium (p H ; p H ) had a size of supporting beliefs equal to 0:5; which is ten times larger than the former one, and therefore in this game there is a substantial di¤erence between the size of the two sets.
Notice also, that we predict an equilibrium action pro…le. We do not specify the particular equilibrium that supports this equilibrium action pro…le. We seek to explain agents'behavior and choices, and an action pro…le contains a full prediction over these.
The motivation for this selection criterion is agnostic about beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Selection criteria based on passive, symmetric or wary beliefs assume that o¤-path beliefs take a particular form, and discard any equilibria not supported by these particular beliefs. But the focality of these beliefs to the exclusion of all others is often di¢ cult to justify, as we discussed in the introduction. We take a more 13 Note that there can be more than one equilibrium action pro…le with a largest set of beliefs. In Appendix A1, however, we show that the equilibrium supported by a largest set of beliefs is generally unique over a collection of perturbed games. Hence, we refer to a as the equilbirium action pro…le with the largest set of beliefs.
open-minded approach toward o¤-path beliefs. Following traditional pure game theory, we conjecture that agents may have any beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Unable to predict which o¤ equilibrium beliefs agents hold, we use a uniform prior over all possible beliefs.
In some applications, we may have a-priori knowledge about which beliefs are more likely to emerge. In these cases, we can adapt our selection criterion, replacing the Lebesgue measure by a measure that assigns weights to beliefs according to the probability distribution that best …ts the a-priori knowledge. Passive, wary and symmetric beliefs can be interpreted as an extreme case of this approach, in which the measure on beliefs assigns all weight to a speci…c belief. Absent good a-priori knowledge over o¤-path beliefs, the measure to use under the veil of ignorance should be the Lebesgue measure.
The purpose of any equilibrium re…nement or selection criterion is to solve the problem of multiplicity under a preferred solution concept by imposing additional restrictions to yield a sharper, ideally unique, prediction. An essential property of a useful re…nement or selection criterion is that the criterion must make a non-empty selection. Unfortunately, selection by passive or symmetric beliefs fail this basic requirement even for …nite games: in some …nite games with pure strategy equilibria, requiring beliefs to be passive, or to be symmetric, eliminates all pure strategy equilibria (see Rey and Tirole, 2007 , for lack of existence of pure equilibria with passive beliefs). 14 Within this class of games, selection by the largest set of beliefs obtains uniqueness generically (while selection using passive or symmetric beliefs does not attain generic uniqueness). We formalize and prove this claim in Appendix A1.
We also note that our selection criterion is robust (i.e. delivers an invariant prediction) if we relabel agents or actions, and it is also invariant to a¢ ne transformations of the payo¤ matrix. Being a re…nement of Sequential Equilibrium, our selection criterion is sensitive to changes in the extensive form tree resulting from the addition of strategically super ‡uous moves, the elimination of dominated strategies, or the addition of cloned (payo¤-equivalent) strategies.
Having established that our selection criterion better satis…es desirable theoretical properties (existence and uniqueness), in the next section we test how its predictive power compares to that of other alternatives in the main application of interest.
Experimental Evidence

Experimental Design and Procedures
We use controlled laboratory experiments to evaluate the predictive power of the di¤erent selection criteria. We implemented two di¤erent treatments, denoted by treatment L and treatment H, which constitute a variation of the motivating example presented in Section 2. Unlike in the motivating example, the games implemented in each treatment allow for only two pure equilibrium pro…les.
All participants were given the role of either a supplier or a retailer, and kept that role throughout the experiment. In each period, suppliers made independent o¤ers to each of two retailers. An o¤er took the form of one of two prices: a low price p L or a high price p H . Because we preferred a more parsimonious game, we constrained the strategy set of retailers. If they were o¤ered p H , retailers could buy either zero or one units; and if the price was p L , they could purchase either zero, two or three units. Suppliers' payo¤s were kept …xed across treatments, while retailers' payo¤s varied across treatments. These payo¤s are summarized in tables 1 and 2. All these payo¤s are expressed in talers, the experimental currency.
Participants played the game for 50 rounds, being re-matched after every round within matching groups of 12 subjects. After each round, subjects received full feedback concerning the actions of all subjects in their subgroup and their payo¤s for that round. To determine payment, the computer randomly selected …ve periods for the …nal payment. The total amount earned in these periods was transformed into euros through the conversion rate of 0:03 in Treatment L and 0:045 in Treatment H. treatment. Students were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
All experimental sessions were organized using the same procedure. Subjects received detailed written instructions, which an experimenter read aloud (see Appendix A5). Subjects were asked to answer a quiz to check their full understanding of the experimental design before beginning the experiment. At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a short survey which we describe in Appendix A4.
Predictions. As we show in Claim 3 in Appendix A2, games in treatments L and H allow for two pure Sequential Equilibrium action pro…les. In the …rst equilibrium action pro…le, the supplier o¤ers p L to both retailers, and each retailer purchases two units. We refer to this action pro…le ((p L ; p L ); (2; 2)) as the L equilibrium action pro…le. The strategy pro…le that sustains this action pro…le in equilibrium is such that retailers would not purchase any unit if o¤ered the high price, because they both mutually fear that the other retailer would still purchase two units at a low price.
The supplier is thus stuck in a low price equilibrium (which gives him lower pro…ts), being unable to credibly deviate to o¤er the high price to both retailers.
We denote by H the second equilibrium action pro…le ((p H ; p H ); (1; 1)), in which the supplier o¤ers p H to both retailers, and each retailer purchases one unit. The strategy pro…le that sustains action pro…le H in equilibrium is such that retailers who observe a deviation to a low price do not believe that the o¤er is exclusive to them: they fear the other retailer received it as well, and thus that quantities in the market will be large, which limits their willingness to purchase to only two units, thwarting the supplier's incentive to deviate in the …rst place.
As we show in Appendices A2 and A3, the predictions by symmetric beliefs, Our selection criterion predicts equilibrium action pro…le L in Treatment L and equilibrium action pro…le H in Treatment H. 15 
Experimental Results
We organize our discussion of the experimental results by focusing, in turn, on prices, quantities and goodness of …t. Appendix A4 has additional data on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Figure 1 plots the aggregate prices o¤ered by suppliers in both treatments, aggregated by groups of …ve periods. Each bar is divided into three tones of gray: the dark gray part represents the frequency of suppliers who o¤ered both retailers the high price,
Prices
the medium gray part represents the frequency of suppliers who o¤ered a high price for one retailer and a low price for the other, and the light gray part represents the frequency of suppliers who o¤ered the low price to both retailers.
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Caption: Aggregate prices in both treatments, aggregated by groups of …ve periods.
The …gure makes two points quite clearly. First, there is a stark contrast between the pricing strategies used in both treatments: although in Treatment L prices are high only in 12% of the cases, in Treatment H they are high in 72:21% of the cases.
This di¤erence is clearly signi…cant (Mann-Whitney test, z = 2:882, p = 0:0039). 16 This di¤erence across treatments is in line with the prediction of the largest set of Table 3 presents a general evaluation of our predictions in a three-level (overall, matching group, and subject levels) mixed-e¤ects ordered logistic regression of the amount of high prices set by suppliers as a function of treatment and the period number, and both interacted. 17 Table 3 indicates the strong treatment e¤ect found above and the convergence pattern observed in Figure 1 . 
Quantities
Goodness of Fit
The main goal of the experimental part of this paper is to evaluate the predictive power of the di¤erent selection criteria described in the previous section. In this subsection we address this question by comparing a measure of goodness of …t. The measure of …t that we use is the percentage of observations in which the entire group behaved as predicted by a given equilibrium conditional on playing an equilibrium. percentage of groups that played an equilibrium action pro…le. 18 Overall, we …nd that our selection criterion outperforms both the common prediction of passive/wary beliefs and proper equilibrium, as well as the prediction of symmetric beliefs. While our selection criterion makes the right prediction in 94:46% of cases, passive/wary beliefs or proper equilibrium make the right prediction in 54:10%
of cases, and symmetric beliefs in 45:90%. These di¤erences are signi…cant (Wilcoxon test, z = 1:819, p = 0:0690 and z = 2:411, p = 0:0159).
When we disaggregate by the di¤erent games, the predictive power of our selection criterion equalizes the best of the other criteria. Recall that in L, the prediction of our criterion coincides with the prediction of the equilibrium under passive and wary beliefs or proper equilibrium, while in H, the prediction of our criterion coincides with the prediction of the equilibrium under symmetric beliefs. Therefore, our selection criterion coincides with one of the others in each game by construction. The noticeable feature is that our criterion matches in each case the best performer of the other criteria.
Discussion
In the absence of a theory that explains how agents form out of equilibrium beliefs, any "ad hoc" assumption on out of equilibrium beliefs is arbitrary. The out of equilibrium beliefs held by the players depend on the speci…c game they play: games with di¤erent characteristics lead to di¤erent patterns of beliefs. If we cannot predict with con…dence which beliefs are salient in a given game, we recommend that we consider all out of equilibrium beliefs as equally likely.
Under a uniform prior over out of equilibrium beliefs, not all equilibrium action pro…les are equally likely to emerge in the equilibrium actually played: those that require speci…c beliefs are less likely to be played than action pro…les that hold in equilibrium for a large set of beliefs. The equilibrium action pro…le that is more likely to be played is the one which is supported by the largest set of beliefs. We select this equilibrium action pro…le.
To compute the size of beliefs that support a strategy pro…le s in equilibrium, we must construct a measure over sets of beliefs. In …nite games, we use the standard Lebesgue measure de…ned over the set of all possible beliefs at each out of equilibrium information set that follows an individual deviation.
Our criterion selects the action pro…le that has the largest set of supporting beliefs. The con…dence in our prediction is increasing in the ratio of the largest set of supporting beliefs, over the size of the set of beliefs that sustain other action pro…les.
If the largest set is little larger than others, we conjecture that the equilibrium action pro…le with the largest set of beliefs may not always be played, but that nevertheless the frequency of play of each equilibrium action pro…le that is played will be increasing in the size of beliefs that support it in equilibrium. If our reasoning is correct, we can construct an order or ranking of equilibrium action pro…les from most to least likely to be played, where each action pro…le is ranked according to the size of the set of beliefs that support it in equilibrium.
In an experiment on vertical contracting games, Martin, Normann and Sny-der (2001) …nd that no speci…c restriction on the set of beliefs …ts the data. Beyond this negative …nding, it is di¢ cult to conduct an equilibrium analysis with their data, because in their experiment, no group of players plays according to any equilibrium.
Since all their subject groups are out of equilibrium, comparisons of equilibrium selection predictions are problematic. 19 Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) Our theory can be directly generalized to larger classes of …nite sequential games, including games with more than two stages or with a more complex information structure. Our intuition -select the equilibrium supported by the largest set of beliefsalso applies to continuous games. While a precise formalization poses some technical challenges to de…ne a measure of beliefs over a continuous strategy space, a formal de…nition that overcomes these challenges is available in the online appendix.
We argue that in applications in which we cannot predict players'out of equilibrium beliefs, we should not assume an arbitrarily chosen set of beliefs. Rather, we should accept that di¤erent beliefs might emerge. Our experiments identify one application to vertical contracting in which assuming passive, symmetric or wary beliefs is unwarranted: the predictive power of any of these criteria is not better than selecting equilibria at random. In contrast, selection by the largest set of beliefs predicts the right equilibrium in 94% of cases in which an equilibrium is played.
Appendices Appendix A1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Given a …nite game, there are only …nitely many action pro…les, and thus, only …nitely many of them are equilibrium action pro…les. Let k be the number of di¤erent action pro…les that can be supported in equilibrium. For an arbitrary action pro…le a that can be supported in equilibrium, L( a O(a P ) ) and L( O(a P ) ) are well de…ned, and thus
L( O(a P ) ) and SSB(a) are well de…ned as well. There are at most k di¤erent values of size SSB, and thus, there exists a maximum among them.
Uniqueness of the prediction
In Section 3 we claim that selection by the largest set of supporting beliefs generically yields a unique prediction if no more than one equilibrium action pro…le is supported by every o¤-path belief. We provide a formal statement and proof of this claim.
Let G be a game form, which indicates a set of agents N with n = 1 + n R players (one proposer and n R receivers), a set of feasible strategy pro…les S = S 1 ::: S n of size jSj, and the timing and information structure of a collection of games in G, without specifying the payo¤s. Let U 2 R jAj n de…ne the payo¤ for each agent, for each possible action pro…le. Then = (G; U ) 2 G de…nes a speci…c game. For any " > 0; let P " (U ) be the set of possible perturbations of U such that the proposer' payo¤ stays unaltered, and the payo¤ of each receiver is altered by no more than ": Formally, let U a 2 R n denote the payo¤ vector for any action pro…le a 2 A; and let U ak denote the k th component of vector U a : Then, for any " 0; P " (U ) = fU 0 2 R jAj n : jU ak U 0 ak j " for any k 2 f2; :::; n R + 1g; for any a 2 Ag: Let P " ( ) = (G; P " (U )) be the collection of games with the same set of pure strategy equilibria as game that can be generated by perturbing game according to perturbations in P " (U ):
Proposition 2 Assume action pro…les a and a 0 can be supported by a largest set of beliefs in game = (G; U ) 2 G and SSB(a) = SSB(a 0 ) 2 (0; 1): Then there exists " > 0 such that the equilibrium action pro…le with a largest set of supporting beliefs is generically unique over the class of games P " ( ). An upstream …rm (supplier) labeled 0; makes independent o¤ers to each of two retailers f1; 2g. The supplier sells a good. An o¤er takes the form of a price. Let p 1 ; p 2 2 fp H ; p L g be the prices o¤ered by the supplier to retailers 1 and 2; where p H 2 R ++ and p L 2 R ++ are an exogenously given high and low price, respectively. The strategy set of the supplier is S 0 = f(p H ; p H ); (p H ; p L ); (p L ; p H ); (p L ; p L )g; where the …rst component indicates the o¤er made to retailer 1 and the second the o¤er made to retailer 2: O¤ers are simultaneously and privately made, so that each retailer observes the o¤er she receives, but not the o¤er the other retailer receives. Retailers choose how many units to purchase. Because we prefer a more parsimonious game, we constrain the strategy set of retailers. If the price is p H ; we assume that retailers can buy zero or one units; and if the price is p L , zero, two or three units. Hence the strategy set for each retailer i is S i = f0; 1g f0; 2; 3g, where each strategy (s iH ; s iL ) 2 S i corresponds to how much to purchase following a p H o¤er (…rst coordinate) and following a p L o¤er (second coordinate). A strategy pro…le is an element of fp H ; p L g 2 (f0; 1g f0; 2; 3g) 2 :
The supplier incurs a transaction cost c 0 2 R + for each executed trade, and each retailer incurs a transaction cost c r 2 R + if she accepts an o¤er. Let q i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g be the quantity purchased by retailer i. Retailers sell their units of the good in the consumer market. The aggregate supply is Q = q 1 + q 2 : If Q > 0; the price of the good in the consumer market is a function p : f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g ! R + of the aggregate supply Q. We assume function p is strictly decreasing in Q. Pro…ts for the supplier and retailer i are
pro…ts are zero for all players.
The game form contains ten parameters. Let = (p H ; p L ; c 0 ; c r ; p(1); p(2); p(3); p(4); p(5); p(6)) be a parameter vector. We are interested in parameter values that generate multiple (two) equilibria in which di¤erent selection criteria generate di¤erent predictions. De…nition 2 Let be the set of parameter vectors such that 2 if and only if i) 3p L > p H > 2p L > c 0 , and ii) for each retailer i; the best response correspondences BR i (p i ; q i ) are given by the following table:
Quantity
According to the …rst condition, selling one unit at a high price is better for the supplier than selling two at a low price, but not as good as selling three at a low price (and any transaction is better than no transaction). The second condition on retailers'best responses leads to the existence of two equilibria: one in which both retailers purchase one unit at price p H , and another in which both retailers purchase two units at price p L . No other outcome can be sustained in a pure equilibrium.
For any parameter vector ; let be the game with the speci…ed game form, and parameter values : Let an action pro…le sustained in equilibrium (or, simply, an equilibrium action pro…le), be the action played by the supplier according to the equilibrium strategy pro…le, and the actions played by the retailers along the equilibrium path, that is, in case the supplier does not deviate from her equilibrium strategy.
Claim 3 For any 2 ; the set of action pro…les that are sustained in a pure Sequential Equilibrium of game is f((p L ; p L ); 2; 2), ((p H ; p H ); 1; 1)g.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary 2 and the corresponding game ; we …rst prove that there are two pure strategy pro…les that are supported in a Sequential Equilibrium of the game. Consider …rst strategy pro…le ((L; L); (0; 2); (0; 2)): For each retailer to buy two units is the unique best response when the price o¤ered is low and the other retailer is buying two units. If the supplier deviates by proposing a high price to some retailer, then she decreases her payo¤ because the retailer buys zero units and the deviation is not observed by the other retailer. When the price o¤ered is high, to buy zero units is a best response for a retailer who assigns probability one that the supplier is proposing a low price to the other retailer. Thus ((L; L); (0; 2); (0; 2)) satis…es sequential rationality. A totally mixed strategy pro…le that assigns probability 1 " to suppliers' strategy ((L; L); (0; 2); (0; 2)) and probability " 2 " 2 to ((L; H); (0; 2); (0; 2)) and ((H; L); (0; 2); (0; 2)) and " 2 to all other strategies combined, with each of these strategies receiving equal weight, converges as " ! 0 to pro…le ((L; L); (0; 2); (0; 2)) and the beliefs obtained by Bayesian updating for any " > 0 converge to the beliefs speci…ed above that a retailer observing an o¤er of a high price believes the supplier o¤ers a low price to the other retailer with probability one. Thus the equilibrium satis…es belief consistency.
Consider the strategy pro…le ((H; H); (1; 2); (1; 2)): For each retailer to buy one unit is the unique best response when the price is high and the other retailer is buying one unit. If the supplier deviates proposing a low price to any retailer, she decreases her payo¤ because the retailer buys two units and by assumption p H > 2p L : To buy two units when the price o¤ered is low is a best response for a retailer who assigns probability one that the supplier is proposing a low price to the other retailer, too. Thus ((H; H); (0; 2); (0; 2)) satis…es sequential rationality. A totally mixed strategy pro…le that assigns probability 1 " to suppliers' strategy ((H; H); (1; 2); (1; 2)) and probability " " 2 to ((L; L); (1; 2); (1; 2)) and " 2 to all other strategies combined, with each of these strategies receiving equal weight, converges as " ! 0 to pro…le ((H; H); (1; 2); (1; 2)) and the beliefs obtained by Bayesian updating for any " > 0 converge to the beliefs speci…ed above that a retailer observing an o¤er of a low price believes the supplier o¤ers a low price to the other retailer with probability one. Thus the equilibrium satis…es belief consistency.
Consider now any other strategy pro…le. First, notice that if the supplier proposes a high price to retailer i = 1; 2, retailer i buys a positive amount if and only if retailer j 6 = i buys at most one unit. If retailer i buys at most one unit (as he is forced to do if the price o¤ered to him is high), retailer j 0 s best response is to buy two or three units when the price o¤ered to him is low: It follows that if, in equilibrium, the supplier o¤ers a high price to retailer i and a low price to retailer j, then retailer i buys zero unit, and retailer j buys two units. However, if the supplier deviates and o¤ers a low price to retailer i; then retailer i's best response is to buy a positive amount, irrespective of his beliefs about the price o¤ered by the supplier to retailer j: Therefore the deviation is pro…table for the supplier. It follows that there are no asymmetric equilibria such that the supplier o¤ers a high price to a retailer and a low price to the other one. If the supplier o¤ers a high price to both retailers, to buy one unit is the best response for each retailer irrespective of the amount that the other retailer buys. If the supplier o¤ers a low price to both retailers, if retailer i buys three units, retailer j 0 s best response is to buy zero units. However, to buy three units for retailer i is not the best response when retailer j buys zero units. Hence, there are no equilibria such that the supplier o¤ers a low price to both retailers and some retailer buys a quantity di¤erent than two.
The …rst equilibrium action pro…le is ((p L ; p L ); 2; 2); that is, the supplier o¤ers a low price to both retailers, and each retailer purchases two units. We refer to this action pro…le as the L equilibrium action pro…le. The strategy pro…le that sustains this action pro…le in equilibrium is such that retailers would not purchase any unit if o¤ered the high price, because they both mutually fear that the other retailer would still purchase two units at a low price. The supplier is thus stuck in a low price equilibrium (which gives him lower pro…ts), being unable to credibly deviate to o¤er the high price to both retailers.
In the second equilibrium action pro…le, denoted H, prices are high, quantities low. The supplier could be tempted to deviate by o¤ering a low price to a retailer, who would then bene…t from purchasing three units, which would increase the supplier's pro…t. However, the strategy pro…le that sustains action pro…le H in equilibrium is such that retailers who observe a deviation to a low price do not believe that the o¤er is exclusive to them: they fear the other retailer received it as well, and thus that quantities in the market will be large, which limits their willingness to purchase to only two units, thwarting the supplier's incentive to deviate in the …rst place.
Claim 4 For any 2 , ((p L ; p L ); 2; 2) is the unique action pro…le supported by passive beliefs in a pure Sequential equilibrium of game , and is also the unique action pro…le supported by wary beliefs; whereas ((p H ; p H ); 1; 1) is the unique action pro…le supported by symmetric beliefs. Proof. This claim follows immediately from the proof of Claim 3 and the de…nitions of passive beliefs, and symmetric beliefs.
The action pro…le ((p L ; p L ); 2; 2) is also the unique action pro…le sustained in a proper equilibrium (Claim 5 in Appendix A3).
Whether an equilibrium holds or not hinges on the belief that the other retailer was o¤ered a high price p H . Let ! i (p H jp i ); be the probability assigned by retailer i with beliefs ! i to p i = p H after observingp i : Equilibrium action pro…le L is supported by beliefs such that, after observing o¤er p i = p H ; retailer i chooses not to purchase any units, which implies that
Equilibrium action pro…le H is supported by beliefs such that, observing o¤erp i = p L ; retailer i chooses to purchase two units, and not three, which implies that
Let (5) and
The hyperplane p H +cr p(3) p(1) p(3) = p L 3p(5)+2p(4) 5p(4) 2p(3) 3p (5) divides the set of parameter vectors into two regions denoted by L and H . In the region L a larger set of beliefs sustains the equilibrium L and in the region H a larger set of beliefs sustains the equilibrium H: Notice that ( L [ H ) has measure zero; the equilibrium supported by the largest set of beliefs is generically unique over the set of parameters. We obtain the following prediction:
Prediction If 2 L , we predict that subjects will play the L equilibrium, if 2 H , we predict that subjects will play the H equilibrium, based on the size of the set of beliefs that support each equilibrium.
The two treatments presented in Section 4.1 use di¤erent parameter constellations, with L 2 L in treatment L and H 2 H in treatment H. Unlike in the motivating example, the parameters related to supplier payo¤s are kept …xed across the two games: supplier prices are p H = 36; p L = 15 and the supplier's transaction cost for any executed trade is c 0 = 15. The two treatments di¤er, however, in the variables that a¤ect retailers'payo¤s. In Treatment L, the retailer's transaction cost for any positive purchase is c r = 29 and the vector of consumer market prices is (72; 71; 35; 34; 27; 22) ; where coordinate k denotes the price if k units are sold in the market, for any number of units k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. In Treatment H, the retailer's transaction cost for any positive purchase is c r = 33; and the vector of consumer market prices is (120; 105; 59; 45; 27; 18):
In Treatment L with parameter values L ; the size of the set of beliefs that support action pro…le L in equilibrium is 0:81; and the size of the set of beliefs that support H is 0:10: In Treatment H with parameter values H ; this size is 0:16 for action pro…le L and 0:93 for action pro…le H:
We made an a¢ ne transformation to the payo¤ function, which has no strategic consequences, but yields two advantages for experimental purposes: we avoid negative payo¤s to subjects by adding a constant, and we equalize supplier and retailers'expected payo¤s by multiplying the supplier's payo¤s by 4=3. Tables 1 and 2 respectively summarize retailers' payo¤s and supplier's payo¤s.
Appendix A3. Alternative Selection Criteria
For completeness, we have also considered a number of other re…nements that, to our knowledge, have not been previously used in our application of interest, but are prominent in other game theoretic research. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) propose payo¤ dominance and risk-dominance. Payo¤ dominance selects a Pareto superior equilibrium (one that yields higher payo¤s to every player) over a Pareto inferior one. This criterion may seem plausible when it is applicable, which is only seldom. 20 Risk dominance, extended by Harsanyi (1995) and Selten (1995) selects the equilibrium that is least risky in the sense that each player minimizes the potential losses if she cannot anticipate which equilibrium will be played by other agents. Risk dominance is de…ned for normal form games and while it has performed well in laboratory experiments on coordination games (Cabrales, Garc¬a-Fontes and Motta, 2000; Schmidt, Shupp, Walker and Ostrom, 2003), it is not obvious how to apply the intuition underlying this concept to games with imperfect information in a compelling manner. Peski (2010) introduces two variations of risk dominance that apply to any …nite normal form game, but the intuition behind these two re…nements does not extend well to sequential games and in our application, both re…nements deliver an empty prediction. Forward induction as de…ned by Govindan and Wilson (2009) is applicable and makes a non-empty prediction. Alas, this prediction does not solve our multiplicity problem: all equilibria in the vertical contracting game we study satisfy forward induction. 21 Myerson's (1978) proper equilibrium re…nement is the only one of these concepts that is applicable and o¤ers a sharper prediction in our games, as the next claim shows.
Claim 5 For any 2 , the unique proper equilibrium of the vertical contracting game with parameter vector is such that agents play strategy pro…le ((p L ; p L ); (0; 2); (0; 2)).
Proof. For any 2 ; the set of pure strategy pro…les that are sustained in a Sequential Equilibrium of game is f((p L ; p L ); (0; 2); (0; 2)); ((p H ; p H ); (1; 2); (1; 2))g. Consider …rst the equilibrium ((p H ; p H ); (1; 2); (1; 2)): A Sequential Equilibrium in which (q 1 ; q 2 ) = (1; 1) is supported by strategy pro…le ((p H ; p H ); (1; 2); (1; 2))g and beliefs such that retailer i observing p i = p L believes with su¢ ciently high probability that p i = p L and thus expects q i = 2: However the deviation (consistent with p i = p L ) that provides the highest payo¤ to the supplier is such that the supplier is still playing the strategy p i = p H and therefore in any proper equilibrium, the retailer should assign a probability which gives a higher weight (of the order of 1 " for " > 0 in…nitesimally small) to strategies according to which the deviating proposer plays p i = p H . However, the best response according to these beliefs is such that when i observes p i = p L , i should buy three units and not two units as prescribed by the equilibrium, making the deviation pro…table for the supplier. Therefore this equilibrium strategy pro…le cannot be supported as a proper equilibrium. Consider the equilibrium ((p L ; p L ); (0; 2); (0; 2)): A Sequential Equilibrium in which (q 1 ; q 2 ) = (2; 2) is supported by strategy pro…le ((p L ; p L ); (0; 2); (0; 2))g and beliefs such that retailer i observing p i = p H believes with su¢ ciently high probability that p i = p L and thus expects q i = 2: Since the deviation (consistent with p i = p H ) that provides the highest payo¤ to the supplier is such that the supplier is still playing the strategy p i = p L ; then this strategy pro…le is supported by beliefs that satisfy the " proper equilibrium re…nement.
Despite the sharper prediction, the predictive power of proper equilibrium is underwhelming: its predictions coincide with those of selection by wary beliefs, and thus it underperforms relative to equilibrium selection based on identifying the strategy pro…le that can be supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. Finally, in a more recent research paper, In and Wright (2017) propose a new equilibrium concept to re…ne the set of Sequential equilibria in a class of senders-receivers games. They name this concept "RI-equilibrium." As shown by In and Wright (2017), Section 5.4., in games of vertical contracting with one proposer and two receivers -such as those in our treatments-the RI-equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium with wary beliefs and with the proper equilibrium. More generally, the RI-equilibria are a superset of the proper equilibria). Therefore, Table 5 : Joint distribution of beliefs (in absolute numbers). P indicates the prediction by the passive beliefs and S indicates the prediction by symmetric beliefs.
the RI-equilibrium does not o¤er as good a prediction as our selection criterion in our experiment.
Appendix A4. Beliefs
Beliefs are a crucial element of equilibrium selection in the games presented. In order to assess whether game play was related to participants'beliefs, we elicited beliefs of retailers in a non-incentivized manner at the end of the experiment. 22 Immediately after …nishing the main part of the experiment, subjects completed a questionnaire. The two …rst questions related to their beliefs. In particular, we asked the following questions: "Suppose that you play an additional period as a retailer. If the supplier o¤ers you a low / high price, which price do you think the supplier will o¤er to the other retailer?" They could either answer "Low Price" or "High Price." Table 5 shows the joint distributions of beliefs. The matrix shows a substantial di¤erence between treatments. As indicated in the table, according to the equilibrium with symmetric beliefs, a retailer i would expect the retailer j to be o¤ered a low price when i is o¤ered a low price, and a high price when i is o¤ered a high price. In the equilibrium with passive beliefs, retailers expect the other retailer to be o¤ered a low price regardless of the price o¤ered to themselves.
Note that in Treatment L, most retailers'beliefs are in line with the beliefs predicted by passive beliefs although in Treatment H, instead, most retailers'beliefs are in line with the prediction of symmetric beliefs. These …ndings reinforce the results shown in the previous section: a selection criterion that imposes an invariant assumption on beliefs regardless of the nature of the game is inappropriately restrictive, and a poor …t of the data. O¤-path beliefs depend on the particular game. the suppliers have four possible decisions:
1. Charge a low price to both retailers. 2. Charge a low price to Retailer 1 and a high price to Retailer 2. 3. Charge a high price to Retailer 1 and a low price to Retailer 2. 4. Charge a high price to both retailers.
Quantity Setting Stage. In the quantity setting stage, only retailers will have to make a decision. Each retailer will have to decide the quantity to buy from the supplier of their group.
-If the supplier charged a low price, the retailer can buy either 0, 2 or 3 units.
-If the supplier charged a high price, the retailer can buy either 0 or 1 unit. When deciding the quantity, retailers will not know the price o¤ered to the other retailer of the group.
Payo¤s for the Supplier. The supplier's payo¤ from sales to each of the retailers will depend on the price charged and on the quantity that the retailer decided to buy. Next table displays the payo¤ for each of the possible combinations of prices and quantities. The total payo¤ of a supplier is equal to the sum of payo¤s from sales to each of the retailers.
Payo¤s for the Retailers. The payo¤ of a retailer depends on the quantity bought by the retailer and the quantity bought by the other retailer of his group. Your payo¤ is summarized in the following table:  Quantity Bought by  the other retailer  0  1  2  3  0  28  28  28  28  Quantity  1  79  64  18  4  Bought  2  175  83  55  19  by you  3  127  85  31  4 In other words: -If you buy 0 unit and the other retailer buys 0, 1, 2 or 3 units, your payo¤ is 28. Remember that if you have been o¤ered a high price you can only buy zero or one units, and that if you have been o¤ered a low price, then you can buy either zero, two or three units. The same holds for the other retailer.
Information at the end of each Round. At the end of each round, all participants will receive the following information:
(i) the prices o¤ered to each retailer (ii) the quantities bought by each retailer (iii) your payo¤
Final Earnings. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select 4 rounds and you will earn the payo¤s you obtained in these rounds. Each of the 50 rounds has the same chance of being selected. The total number of points accumulated in these 5 selected rounds will be transformed into euros by multiplying your earnings in talers by a conversion rate. For this experiment the conversion rate is 0.075, meaning that 100 talers equal 7.5 Euros. Additionally; you will earn a show-up fee of 4.00e. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
Control Questions. Before starting this part, you will have to …ll in some control questions in the computer terminal. Click the button Ok after you have answered a question to move to the next question. In case you answer wrongly, a message will pop out with the right answer and you will have to answer it again. Once you and all the other participants have …lled all the questions the experiment will start.
